new year’s eve

December 31, 2012

 

new to the

wouldn’t you agree that it

doesn’t seem the same  don’t you

love the birth of spring

December 31, 2012

how about once the blue glitter

is finally gone from the car

promise to forget by then

except when neck deep in waves

no promises that it won’t be

blue glitter mouth wide open

December 31, 2012

(dedicated to dr dancy )

 

and with another paper

stamped mediocre, sent back

 

i note that, how else would i know that,

while i grow through their roof, that

 

my values are not their values, that

 i can rest assure, that

 

i’m still on the right track

Sean: So it’s just going to be me and Izzy for the Mayan apocalypse. I’m going to have to weave a satchel.

Me: out of Izzy’s fur?

Sean: (indignant) NO, Mary…I’m going to weave a satchel *for Izzy*, to carry Izzy in, when we have to run from the Mayans.

Me: Sean, the Mayans aren’t coming back. That’s not how the Mayan apocalypse works..

Sean: Yes they are, but they’re only going to rapture some of us up. Only fellow Mayans.

Me: I think you got your apocalypse fables mixed up.

Was Plato a feminist?

December 16, 2012

____

Concluding Remarks Feminist utopias are premised on an egalitarian ethos, wherein the diversity in human natures are not open to judgment as inferior or superior, as more or less worthy relative to any individual judgment, and especially not relative to the whims of those few beneficiaries of  the (materially contingent) privileges of social power. Human natures are equal in dignity and in worth, and feminists advocate that social policies are conceived to reflect such truths. Plato’s ideal state was premised on an authoritarian ethos, wherein diversity in human nature was open to judgment as inferior or superior, as more or less worthy relative to his own trusted judgment, and especially relative to the whims of those few beneficiaries of the (materially contingent) privileges of social power. Human natures were not equal in dignity and in worth, and Plato did not advocate sex-neutral social policies in order to do justice to such an assumption. Therefore, in ways that are critically relevant to feminist philosophers, Plato’s philosophy of social justice was antithetical to our own. Plato was not a feminist, and the methodological approach that attempts to constrain interpretation of his work to the point that Plato could neatly be labeled and marketed as such, does so only by means of  biased dismissal of all the relevant historical, social, and cultural meaning denoted by the term “feminism.”

____

There is nothing feminist about (one-size-fits-all) unisex shackles.

December 13, 2012

Philosophers’ Methodologies Contra Cappelen, I advanced the hypothesis that ‘intuition-talk’ in philosophy most likely tracks  experientially-biased inferences and value-judgments, concerning, among other things, theoreticians’ preferential pattern selection, and directionality in causal correlations, in the explication of theories. CT should, therefore, be interpreted as a descriptive claim concerning philosophical methodology; namely, that whatever intuitions are, they are indicative of subjective elements in the cognizing process, and that such inferential biases are inherent to all epistemologies. Cappelen suggests that such broad notions of intuitive judgments are not what his suspect analytic philosophers had in mind in their endorsement of CT; he interprets their claim as a thesis endorsement of philosophical exceptionalism- i.e. the view that the methodological differences between philosophy and other epistemologies are deeply substantive (Williamson 3). Since this proposal does not endorse philosophical exceptionalism, beyond what would be captured by an account of philosophers’ differential group experiences (qua philosophizing), Cappelen may consider it a failed attempt to capture the intent underlying broad analytic support for CT (Cappelen 16). Even if he were right in his judgment, this proposal draws attention to CT in a more productuve manner, that puts methodological pressure on such analytic philosophers to either (1) acknowledge the inherent limitations in their a priori knowledge claims in terms of subjective elements in cognizing processes (i.e. admit that ‘intuitions-talk’ does track experientially-biased inference and value-judgment), or (2) offer an instructive, alternative account of ‘intuition-talk’ in philosophy. I much prefer this approach to Cappelen’s endorsement of the thesis that philosophical theories do not involve intuitive judgments whatsoever, since it offered no positive account whatsoever of the subjective elements essentially involved in philosophizing, and stripped analytic philosophers of their sole (unintentional or intentional) theoretical disclaimer of kinship to all other forms of creative human thought, namely, CT. This gives non-philosophers the false impression that philosophers enjoy some sort of privileged epistemic capacity to transcend the necessary limitations of historical, social, and culturally embedded cognizing; inadvertently attributing a level of privileged epistemic authority to philosophical knowledge claims that no methodologically self-aware philosopher would endorse.

Resources

 

-Allmon, Warren D., Kelley, Patricia H., & Ross, Robert M. Ed. Stephen Jay Gould: Reflections on His View of Life : OxfordUniversity Press: New York 2009.

 -Cappelen, Herman. Philosophy Without Intuitions. OxfordUniversity Press: Oxford 2012.

 -Gould, Stephen Jay. The Mismeasure of Man. W.W. Norton & Company: New York 1981.

-Gould, Stephen Jay. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge 2002.

-Jenkins, C. S. “Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience”.The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 233: October 2008.

-McMullin, Ernan. “Values in Science”. Source: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of thePhilosophy of Science Association. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1983.

-Mills, Charles W. Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. CornellUniversity Press:Ithica 1998.

-Tanesini, Alessandra. An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies. Blackwell Publishers Inc:Malden 1999.

-Williamson, Timothy. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Publishing: Malden 2007.